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The purpose of this major research paper is to examine the effectiveness of carbon 
pricing systems, in terms of their political longevity and their environmental robustness. 
It aims at comparing carbon taxes with cap-and-trade regimes in the Canadian context, 
to investigate which one of these two approaches can withstand electoral political 
change, and to assess whether such systems can result in GHG emission reductions. 
The research also examines the possibility of the simultaneous implementation of 
carbon taxes and cap-and-trade mechanisms. Furthermore, it explores whether carbon 
pricing systems could be implemented with other climate change mitigation policies. In 
addition, it identifies limitations and trade-offs that the implementation of carbon pricing 
faces. Finally, it provides policy recommendations for advancing such systems in 
Canada in particular. The paper contributes, as well, to the understanding of whether 
carbon taxes really make sense by highlighting the economics of emissions reduction 






Although this major paper focuses on the performance of carbon pricing systems in 
Canada, it is based on a broader intellectual context and components that have guided 
my research within the MES program. Prior to my MES studies, I had completed a 
graduate program in Disaster and Emergency Management. In that program I became 
familiar with the provocative ideas of “managing without growth” and “re-imagining 
capitalism”. Starting the MES program, initially I wanted to investigate what vulnerability 
means from the perspective of ecological economics, and especially had ambition to 
explore whether re-imagining capitalism puts our planet on the right track towards 
Sustainable Development (SD). In my plan of study, therefore, I chose the following 
area of concentration: Towards Sustainable Development or Corporate Bad Ethics? 
This area of interest was followed through three interlinked components: Business 
Ethics and Economics; Sustainable Development; and Political Economy. 
In the MES program, particularly, I obtained general knowledge about business 
strategies for sustainability as well as the main challenges businesses are facing today 
and probably in the future within the global context. Also, I consolidated my 
understanding and grasp of the social and environmental aspects of sustainability and 
became interested in renewable energies and carbon pricing – as reasonable pathways 
and solutions to climate change. The structural problems that carbon pricing systems 
suffer from as well as the widespread lack of understanding that carbon taxes really 
make sense were eye-catching. 
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On the verge of the climate tipping point, humans have no choice but to organize 
their economic activity more thoughtfully so that economic development and 
conservation of the natural world can go together. Meanwhile, economists have raised 
hopes that the power of capitalism and economic tools such as carbon pricing systems 
can help humans protect the environment. Despite their theoretical foundations in 
economics, nonetheless, these systems seem to suffer from pitfalls that undermine their 
effectiveness. The literature does not contain many studies focused on these structural 
























In memory of my mother whose words molded my past, drive my present, and shape 
my future ambitions: “Stand for the right and pay the price for it. No cost is too great 
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The scientific community, as summarized by the IPCC’s definitive reports, and as 
stated by Heal (2017), has reached a consensus that, due to the human 
emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs), the Earth is warming and the 
consequences of continued warming are expected to be severe. For a few 
decades, efforts to find solutions to climate change have been focused on 
curbing GHG emissions, particularly carbon dioxide. Nonetheless, given the fact 
that the benefits of addressing the growth of GHG emissions almost certainly 
outweigh the costs – and that the effects of increased emissions remain in the 
atmosphere for so long and affect the welfare of future generations – concerted 
global action to solve the problem is not easily achievable. Who should pay for 
responses to climate change, and how much should be spent on it, are matters 
of ongoing debate due to factors like free riding and global geopolitics. 
Despite the ongoing debate on such matters, the international community 
has agreed, so far, that shaping behavior through market mechanisms such as 
carbon taxes or cap-and-trade regimes are the most effective ways to reduce 
GHG emissions. The Kyoto Protocol, adopted in 1997 and taking effect in 2005, 
was in fact the first attempt to implement a global cap-and-trade system 
(Henderson et al., 2018). Today, the idea of providing incentives to reduce GHG 
emissions and making polluters pay seems to be reasonable and, at least from 
the standpoint of the theory of economics, doable. Economists are especially 
fond of carbon taxes and cap-and-trade systems, as the most acceptable carbon 
pricing tools to combat global warming to date. 
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These market-based approaches are not new. Since the early 1990s 
countries and regions such as Finland, Sweden, Great Britain, Australia, and the 
provinces of Quebec and British Columbia in Canada have adopted carbon 
taxes. Cap-and-trade systems have been explored as well by many jurisdictions. 
The European Union emissions trading system (EU ETS) is a prominent 
international example. China has cap-and-trade systems in operation both at the 
provincial and city scales. Another example is the joint cap-and-trade market 
originally established by Quebec, Ontario and California. Today more national 
and subnational jurisdictions as well as private sector entities are adopting 
carbon pricing. According to a recent World Bank’s (2018) report, to date 51 
carbon pricing initiatives worldwide have been implemented or are scheduled for 
implementation; this consists of 25 emissions trading systems (ETSs), mostly 
located in subnational jurisdictions, and 26 carbon taxing initiatives primarily 
implemented on a national level. The report asserts that carbon pricing can serve 
multiple environmental and social objectives. Nonetheless, there is still a long 
way to go to reach the reality of a sustainable development path. Ahonen et al. 
(2017) provide details about current developments in carbon emissions and 
climate law. 
While carbon pricing is becoming a global trend, there is limited 
agreement on the preferability of either of these two systems over the other. 
Theoretically, carbon taxes and cap-and-trade can perform roughly the same; 
that is, they are different means to the same end: generating revenue for 
governments to put to good use (Aldy, 2017). However, their implementation 
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nuances bring different challenges depending on the local capacity and 
infrastructure levels of each region. Each jurisdiction, therefore, must decide on 
its own approach to pricing carbon. There is no one size or type that fits all. 
The implementation of EU ETS has not been proved yet as a successful 
case of a cap-and-trade regime. Ontario’s defunct cap-and-trade regime is 
another example that illustrates the political challenges that can be faced by such 
systems. On the other side of the coin are the carbon tax systems of Sweden 
and the province of British Columbia in Canada, which represent politically robust 
examples of successful carbon pricing. Such evidence brings to the forefront this 
conjecture: Are carbon taxes indeed superior to cap-and-trade systems? Can 
carbon taxes and cap-and-trade systems be combined with each other and other 
complimentary policies? More specifically, this research analyses the two market 
approaches to carbon pricing currently in use here in Canada to explore those 
questions. 
This paper seeks to answer the following questions: Are carbon taxes 
more effective - i.e. politically withstanding and environmentally robust - than 
their counterparts, cap-and-trade systems? Can carbon taxes and cap-and-trade 
systems be implemented simultaneously? Can carbon pricing be implemented 






Ethical Foundations: The Tragedy of The Commons 
This paper is not intended to be a rudimentary analysis of climate change which 
has become a buzzword in the mainstream socio-economic space. Instead, 
maintaining the fact that the observations and predictions made by scientists (as 
summarized at the most recent IPCC’s reports) have left no doubt about the 
consequences of doing business as usual for the planet Earth and its inhabitants, 
the paper focuses solely on climate change solutions. To provide context, this 
section of the paper focuses on the tragedy of the commons which – as the 
underlying cause of global warming – has brought humans in the modern era 
nothing but misery. 
If economics is about the actions of optimizing economic units (e.g., 
individuals, firms, and governments) as well as the interactions between them, 
maintaining that such economic units are rational decision makers who decide 
based on self-interest, the aggregation of their behavior cannot always serve the 
common good – despite the optimism of Adam Smith’s “Invisible Hand”. That is 
because the world is not full of angels. In other words, there are cases of market 
failure (for instance, negative externalities) in which the aggregation of the 
actions of optimizing economic units results in a bad outcome for all; this is, in 
essence, the tragedy of the commons. 
The tragedy of the commons, in the language of economics, is in fact a 
generalized prisoners’ dilemma; a simultaneous-move game in which each 
individual player (as a separate economic unit) follows its own dominant strategy 
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disregarding the decisions of other stakeholders. While cases of prisoners’ 
dilemma typically lead to an outcome which is pareto inefficient (i.e., there is 
another outcome that makes at least one economic unit better off and nobody 
worse off), even pareto efficiency (as defined in conventional economics) is not 
always fair. Moreover, even trade that might alleviate market inefficiency in 
certain situations, does not always work well. Sometimes only are just-in-time 
negotiations and collective actions that could help solve the tragedy of the 
commons. From this perspective, worldwide carbon pricing would probably be 
the most appropriate global response to the tragedy of climate change. 
 These foundational subjects will be complemented later in the paper by a 
brief discussion of prisoners’ dilemma, simultaneous-move games, and 
negotiation. Moreover, for interested readers a concise timeline of climate 
change is provided in Appendix A. 
The tragedy of the commons is the root cause of dirty kitchens in college 
dorms, environmental problems like littering, traffic congestion, overfishing, air 
pollution, and climate change. All are the same. Only the context and scale are 
different. The problem is that humans are smart, usually driven by self-interest 
and not-in-my-backyard (NIMBY) philosophy in making decisions. This is, in fact, 
the logic behind the idea of the economists who hope making fossil fuels more 
expensive would solve the complex problem of global warming and its dire 
consequences. The tragedy of the commons is an ethical issue which could 
hopefully be managed by economic tools and the power of capitalism. 
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In the context of climate change and carbon pricing, the common-pool 
resource is the shared atmosphere. In that regard the tragedy of the commons – 
the topic of this chapter – can be discussed from two perspectives: ethics and 
common sense, and the theory of economics. 
In his seminal paper, Hardin (1968) quotes – as follows – the conclusion 
of Wisner and York (1964) in an article on the future of nuclear war: 
“Both sides in the arms race … confronted by the dilemma of steadily 
decreasing military power and steadily increasing national security. It is our 
considered professional judgment that this dilemma has no technical solution. If 
the great powers continue to look for solutions in the area of science and 
technology only, the result will be to worsen the situation.” 
By quoting Wisner and York, Hardin wants to refer to a category of problems that 
have no technical solutions. Population growth, as he highlights, is an example of 
such problems. According to him, no-technical-solution problems might demand 
changes beyond the techniques of natural sciences; i.e., requiring changes in 
human values and ideas of morality. Particularly, he refers as well to the Tragedy 
of Freedom in a Commons as the rebuttal to Adam Smith’s “Invisible Hand”, and 
relates the pollution of water and air, as another no-technical-solution problem, to 
the growth of population. “Freedom in a Commons brings ruin to all”, he says. 
Hardin (1968) also believes that the laws of society might follow the 
pattern of ancient ethics; meaning that an act may be quite acceptable if being 
judged by ancient laws, but seen as immoral at the present time due to evolution 
in society. Hardin asserts that problems such as pollution, which demand 
changes beyond natural sciences’ techniques, need to legislate temperance as 
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well. Also, in response to how to do so, he emphasizes that prohibition might be 
easy to legislate, though not necessarily to enforce. Hardin (1968) particularly 
does not believe in conscience to control the behavior of individuals. An appeal 
to conscience, as he says, has both short- and long-term disadvantages. 
According to Hardin: 
“Conscience is self-eliminating” with pathogenic effects and “responsibility 
is a verbal counterfeit for a substantial quid pro quo. It is an attempt to get 
something for nothing.” (Hardin, 1968; page 1247) 
In Hardin’s point of view, temperance can be created particularly by 
coercion, and taxing is a good coercive device. To clarify this, he provides the 
example of a citizen who is offered carefully biased options instead of being 
prohibited to park as long as he/she wants to; in other words, to forbid him/her to 
park for so long it is enough (and of course more effective than prohibition) to 
make parking increasingly more expensive. To create temperance, Hardin 
especially recommends mutually agreed upon coercion measures; supported by 
the majority of people affected. In his point of view, when the lion’s share of 
people living in a given society realize the threat to the commons, they recognize 
the necessity of taxes and other coercive devices to escape the horror of that 
threat. Quoting Hegel, Hardin (1968) particularly refers to the “recognition of 
necessity as freedom”. He highlights as well that the current legal system of the 
society might be destructive, and those who might be bothered by any change – 
and probably call it unjust – should accept the reality that injustice (even if it 
would be the case, as they want to name it) is preferable to total ruin. 
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Hardin’s (1968) “The Tragedy of the Commons” is an insightful article. 
Nonetheless, it is criticized by Ostrom (2008) for confusing open-access 
commons with commons that are the joint property of a community. Ostrom 
differentiates between the two types of the commons as follows:  
“Commons refer to systems, such as knowledge and the digital world, in 
which it is difficult to limit access, but one person’s use does not subtract a 
finite quantity from another’s use. In contrast, common-pool resources are 
sufficiently large that it is difficult, but not impossible, to define recognized 
users and exclude other users altogether. Further, each person’s use of 
such resources subtracts benefits that others might enjoy. Fisheries and 
forests are two common-pool resources that are of great concern in this 
era of major ecological challenges. Others include irrigation systems, 
groundwater basins, pastures and grazing systems, lakes, oceans, and 
the Earth’s atmosphere.” (Ostrom, 2008; page 11) 
She also asserts that Hardin correctly points out that valuable open-access 
common-pool resources would be overharvested; however, his conclusion of an 
inevitable tragedy has been too sweeping. Later in 2012, she clarifies the 
problem further: 
“The classic solution to ‘the tragedy of commons’ problem, provided by 
Hardin (1968), has been to transform the resource into a private good 
(either by privatising it or by turning it into government property with proper 
monitoring.)” (Ostrom, 2012; page 58) 
Unlike Hardin, who believes in a cure-all solution or a panacea to prevent the 
tragedy of the commons (for example by relinquishing the freedom to breed to 
prevent overpopulation), Ostrom emphasizes an on-going improvement by using 
the powers of self-governance and adaptive governance approaches. According 
9 
 
to her, to solve problems related to the commons, it is crucial to understand that 
simple panaceas may work in some settings but fail in others. 
 Ostrom (2008) underlines the importance and effectiveness of quotas 
determined based on active dialogue between local users of a commons, like 
fisheries, in partnership with officials. She strongly believes in the role of 
adaptability in making communities, resources, and systems resilient and 
sustainable. In her article, Ostrom especially refers to some large-scale 
resources having been protected successfully through appropriate international 
governance regimes; e.g., the Montreal Protocol on stratospheric ozone, which 
was signed in 1987 — the same year the Brundtland report was released. She 
emphasizes, as well, the need to significantly reduce GHG emissions as the 
most pressing commons problem at a global level, and refers particularly to the 
European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) — as one of the largest 
regimes in geographic scope aimed at curbing the emissions level. 
I have found the arguments of both Hardin and Ostrom in line with the 
hope of economists to solve the wicked problem of climate change using 
economic tools (carbon pricing approaches) and the power of capitalism. 
Ostrom’s idea of using quotas in managing the harvest of common-pool 
resources seems to me kind of a mutually agreed upon coercion device 
suggested by Hardin. While the Earth’s atmosphere is a common-pool resource, 
cap-and-trade regimes (such as the EU ETS) are based on a quota initiative. 
From the viewpoint of economics, as well, such systems perform roughly the 
same as carbon taxes. They are different means to the same end: they make 
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polluting increasingly more expensive, thereby curbing carbon emissions and 
generating revenue for governments to put to good use. It is not surprising, 
therefore, that these market mechanisms have been accepted internationally as 
the most effective ways to reduce GHG emissions. Carbon taxes and cap-and-
trade regimes could be used to shape the behavior of polluters. This is a 
response, in the context of global warming, to the general question of Hardin 
concerning the unavoidable tragedy of the commons: “How to legislate 
temperance?” Policy makers, in fact, can use carbon pricing approaches to 
legislate temperance and shape the behavior of economic units. 
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Human Responses to Enhanced GHGs 
The Nature and Extent of Climate Change 
Since the Industrial Revolution, a significant amount of GHGs has been added 
into the atmosphere, largely by burning fossil fuels to generate electricity, heat 
and cool buildings, and power vehicles — as well as by clearing forests. The 
lion’s share of enhanced GHGs being added to the atmosphere are carbon 
dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, and fluorinated gases. When these gases are 
emitted into the atmosphere, many remain there for long time periods, ranging 
from a decade to thousands of years. While past emissions affect our 
atmosphere in the present day, current and future emissions will continue to 
increase the levels of these gases in the atmosphere for the foreseeable future. 
(U.S. Environmental Protection Agency [EPA], 2016) 
Common and Stagl (2005) emphasize that what is changing the climate is 
the enhanced greenhouse effect. GHGs, they explain, trap heat (the energy of 
the sun) like a greenhouse in the lower part of the atmosphere. As more of these 
gases are added to the atmosphere, more heat is trapped. This extra heat leads 
to higher air temperatures near the Earth’s surface, changes weather patterns, 
and raises the temperature of the oceans. The estimation of all aspects of 
climate change is a complex and daunting task. One reason behind such 
complexity, as clarified by Henderson et al. (2018), is the presence of positive 
feedback loops. For instance, global warming reduces the amount of snow and 
ice on the Earth’s surface. Since snow and ice reflect more sunlight back into 
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space, compared to exposed land, this reduction further accelerates the rate of 
global warming. 
The Impacts of Climate Change 
People and the environment are tremendously affected by the changes in 
weather patterns and global warming. Sea levels are rising, glaciers are melting, 
and plant and animal life cycles are changing. These types of changes can cause 
fundamental disruptions in ecosystems; thereby affecting plant and animal 
populations, communities, and biodiversity. Such changes can also affect 
people’s health and quality of life, including where they can live, what kinds of 
crops are most viable, what kinds of businesses can thrive in certain areas, and 
the condition of buildings and infrastructure. Some of these changes may be 
beneficial to the people of certain regions. Over time, however, many more of 
these changes have negative consequences for people and society. (EPA, 2016) 
Climate change can directly impact human health and well-being; e.g., 
due to heat stress, increased floods and storms. Its indirect effects can also be 
transmitted via impacting other plants and animals; resulting in agricultural 
productivity reduction or biodiversity loss, as examples. 
The threat of climate change is one of the biggest issues facing the world. 
According to Heal (2017), the scientific community has reached a consensus on 
that, due to the human emissions of greenhouse gases, the Earth is warming and 
the consequences of continued warming are expected to be severe. Outside 
academia, nonetheless, there is widespread disagreement; not only on the issue, 
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but also on how to respond to it. Some people and politicians, known as climate 
deniers, totally reject the role of humans in global warming. Those who accept it, 
look at the issue from different perspectives. Some business leaders, for 
example, see the viability of their firms in jeopardy as a direct consequence of 
climate change. Others, in contrast, consider it as an opportunity to run their 
lucrative businesses by promoting technologies that help communities mitigate 
the risks of climate change and adapt to its effects. (Henderson et al., 2018) 
Responding to the Climate Problem 
Three types of human responses to the enhanced GHGs are distinguishable: 
adaptation, offsetting, and mitigation. Adaptation simply means adjusting climate 
change; as examples, by building defensive walls against floods, limiting 
construction in flood-plain areas, or using new strains of crops to cope with 
higher temperatures (Common and Stagl, 2005). Offsetting is the intentional 
interfering of humans in the climate system; for instance, by injecting sulfates into 
the atmosphere to use their high reflectivity to stop part of the sun’s radiation 
from reaching the Earth’s surface (Henderson et al., 2018). Mitigation involves 
either reducing the amount of GHGs released into the atmosphere, or enhancing 
the operation of the natural sinks for the gases (Common and Stagl, 2005). 
Reduction of GHGs, in its turn, includes one of the three following actions 
(Henderson et al., 2018): 
 moving away from fossil fuels, 
 improvement in energy efficiency, and 
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 changes in land use (e.g., agricultural, and forestry). 
World Economic Forum’s (2018) “The Global Risks Report” identifies failure of 
climate change mitigation and adaptation as one of the top five global risks, in 
terms of both likelihood and impact. On the verge of the climate tipping point, 
humans have no choice but to organize their economic activity more thoughtfully 
so that economic progress and conservation of the natural world can go together 
(Heal, 2017). Carbon pricing approaches (market mechanisms such as carbon 
taxes and cap-and-trade regimes) are, in fact, economic tools that economists 
hope could help us move away from burning fossil fuels. They are intended to 
mitigate the consequences of global warming before it becomes too late. 
Addressing climate change, the greatest external effect in human history 
in Heal’s (2017) terms, is a complex issue as it involves at least three difficult 
problems (Henderson et al., 2018): discount rates, free riding, and global 
geopolitics. Given the fact that the benefits of addressing enhanced GHG 
emissions almost certainly outweigh the costs – and that the effects of increased 
emissions remain in the atmosphere for so long and affect the welfare of future 
generations – still a concerted global action to solve the problem is not easy. 
Who should pay for responses to climate change, and how much should be 
spent are the matters of ongoing debate. Despite the ongoing debate on these 
issues, the international community has agreed upon so far that shaping 
behavior through market mechanisms are the most effective ways to reduce 
GHG emissions. Kyoto Protocol, adopted in 1997 and taking effect in 2005, was 
the first attempt to implement a global cap and trade system. 
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Economics of Emissions Reduction 
A central insight in microeconomics – known as Coase theorem – is that if 
nothing stops people from trading, buyers with high marginal benefits and sellers 
with low marginal costs continue trading until all potential gains from trade are 
exhausted (Coase, 1960). In other words, in the absence of government 
intervention, free exchange tends to move resources to their highest valued use, 
which in that case the allocation of resources is said to be Pareto efficient 
(Cooter, 1989). 
 Competitive markets, nonetheless, do not always perform so miraculously. 
Particularly, when the side effects (externalities) of an economic transaction 
positively or negatively affect those not directly involved in the transaction, 
market outcomes are not efficient anymore (Goodwin et al., 2014). In the case of 
negative externalities (pollution is a classic example), government can regulate 
the side effects by imposing taxes (which in case of pollution they are called 
Pigouvian taxes) on polluting products. Pigouvian taxes are, in fact, economic 
coercion, or persuasion, measures for firms to reduce pollution (Pigou, 2002); 
firms are expected to do so as long as the marginal cost of the reduction is lower 
than the tax (Pearce, 1991; Nordhaus; 1991; Fay et al., 2015). 
Another policy option is tradable pollution permits, which is practically 
identical to Pigouvian taxes although they sound different from each other. Other 
approaches to environmental regulation are setting pollution standards, and 
incorporating pollution-control technologies. Nevertheless, most economists have 
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agreed upon the former two policy options (Pigouvian taxes and tradable 
pollution permits) as the most effective market-based approaches to internalize 
negative externalities, especially when they are carbon emissions. In the next 
section of the paper (Policy Instruments to Reduce GHG Emissions) pollution 
taxes and tradable permits (also known as cap-and-trade) will be compared and 
contrasted. Government intervention in the market also make sense in the case 
of positive externalities. A good example of such externalities is solar panels.  
 This section of the paper begins with the welfare analysis of an excise tax 
which represents the effect of government intervention in the absence of 
externalities – the ideal situation of perfect competition. The analysis depicts that 
in the heavenly world of perfect competition, a market regulation such as an 
excise tax results in the reduction of social welfare. The section continues with 
the formal analysis of negative externalities, first without and then with a 
Pigouvian tax, to highlight the role of government intervention when the side 
effects of an economic transaction negatively affect other economic units; thus, 
making the market outcome inefficient. As it will be illustrated, in the presence of 
negative externalities (e.g., pollution) in the market, regulation seems to be quite 
reasonable because it increases social welfare. Market regulation in the case of 
positive externalities (e.g., solar panels) will also be briefly discussed, and it will 
be shown why a common policy recommendation in the presence of a positive 
externality is to subsidize the product to encourage greater production. 
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Welfare Analysis of Taxation 
According to Goodwin et al. (2014), even common sense is enough to predict 
what will happen to consumer and producer surplus as a result of levying an 
excise tax on a product. It seems reasonable, he says, to expect that both 
decline. When a tax is imposed on a product, the difference between a 
consumer’s maximum willingness to pay and the higher price decreases. Also, in 
a similar way, the difference between the selling price of producer and the 
















Figure 1. Welfare Analysis of an Excise Tax 
 
Source: Modified from Goodwin et al. (2014). Microeconomics in context (Third Edition.). Armonk, New 
York : M.E.Sharpe,. , p. 245. 
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A welfare analysis, as Goodwin et al. (2014) assert, should consider the impacts 
of a market on the rest of society as well. Figure 1 depicts the welfare analysis of 
an excise tax. As shown on the diagram, the supply curve shifts to the left as a 
result of imposing a tax on a given product. There is no tax revenue in the market 
before regulation. Therefore, the social welfare at market equilibrium (E0) is equal 
to the sum of consumer and producer surplus. At the new market equilibrium 
denoted by ETax, however, a smaller amount of the product is manufactured at a 
higher price. 
As illustrated, after government intervention both the consumer and 
producer surplus shrink to provide tax revenues to the society at the expense of 
imposing a deadweight loss equal to the areas denoted by DWL. After the 
regulation, levying the tax, total social welfare comprises tax revenues as well as 
consumer and producer surplus. But, the sum of these three components are 
smaller than the sum of consumer and producer surplus at the market without 
taxation. This analysis shows that in the ideal situation of perfect competition (in 
the absence of the cases of market failures particularly externalities), a market 
regulation such as an excise tax results in the reduction of social welfare while 
the reduction equals the potential gains from trade (DWL areas in the figure) that 
the market no longer exploits for producer and consumer. 
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Welfare Analysis of Negative Externalities 
Unlike an excise tax which results in the reduction of social welfare, a Pigouvian 
tax clearly makes society “better off” (Goodwin et al., 2014). In the presence of a 
negative externality in a market, in fact, the market outcome is inefficient. But, 
levying a pollution tax internalizes the externality for polluters; thereby, making 
social outcome efficient. Below are provided two other scenarios of analyzing 
social welfare. In these scenarios, in the presence of a negative externality, first 
social welfare is analyzed without a Pigouvian Tax, and then it will be analyzed 
with a tax on the polluting product. 
Analysis of a Negative Externality, without a Pigouvian Tax 
When a product generates negative externality in a market, as Goodwin et al. 
explain, social welfare includes three components: consumer surplus, producer 
surplus, and externality damages. Obviously, while the externality damages 
decrease social welfare, the former two contribute to it. Figure 2 depicts each of 
these effects. In the case of a negative externality the social cost of providing a 
good exceeds the private costs (Chiang, 2013); such an externality, therefore, 
can be represented in a supply-and-demand graph (see the figure 2) as an 
additional marginal cost. In the figure, which illustrates the market without any 
regulation, EM denotes market equilibrium; consumer surplus (defined as the 
difference between a consumer’s maximum willingness to pay and the market 
price) is shown by the area above the price but below the demand curve; 
producer surplus (the difference between the equilibrium price and the marginal 
costs of the product) is depicted by the area below the price and above the 
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private marginal cost curve; and finally externality damages are represented by 
the shaded area between the supply and social marginal costs. As Goodwin et 
al. (2014) clarify, in case of a negative externality, the net social welfare of the 
unregulated market (without a Pigouvian tax) equals the following sum: A + B + C 


















Figure 2. Welfare Analysis of a Negative Externality, without a Pigouvian Tax 
Source: Adopted from Goodwin et al. (2014). Microeconomics in context (Third Edition.). Armonk, New 





Analysis of a Negative Externality, with a Pigouvian Tax 
 As explained by Goodwin et al., nonetheless, in the presence of a 
negative externality the net social welfare can be improved by the imposition of a 
















With a Pigouvian tax, the quantity of production falls to QTax in response to the 
rise of the price to PTax. In other words, the regulated market equilibrium forms at 
a lesser quantity of production and a higher price – which is equal to the sum of 
Figure 3. Welfare Analysis of a Negative Externality, with a Pigouvian Tax 
Source: Adopted from Goodwin et al. (2014). Microeconomics in context (Third Edition.). Armonk, New 





marginal and social cost for each unit of production. Now producers and 
consumers share the burden of the tax revenues that are generated while 
consumers’ share of the burden (consumer incidence) is not necessarily equal to 
producers’. Goodwin et al. also emphasize that revenues are exactly equal to 
externality damages (equal to E+F+G, in the figure). Also, like the case of an 
excise tax, in this case as well a deadweight loss (equal to H+I) seems to be 
imposed to market participants. Nonetheless, overall in this case the net social 
benefits increases; although H and I are subtracted respectively from consumer 
surplus and producer surplus, the society has in fact has avoided the negative 
impacts of “too much” production depicted by area K. With a pollution tax, total 
social welfare is comprised of four components: consumer surplus, producer 
surplus, tax revenues, and externality damages. The net benefits (social welfare) 
equals the sum of A, B, C, and D; in that, benefits have increased by the amount 
of K as a result of the Pigouvian tax. 
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Welfare Analysis of Positive Externalities 
Market regulation also make sense in the case of positive externalities 
(e.g., solar panels). As Goodwin et al. explain (see figure 4), a positive externality 
can be considered as an additional marginal benefit gained by society, beyond 
the private benefits of consumers. In the presence of positive externalities, 
therefore, an unregulated market outcome would be inefficient; for example, too 
few solar panels are manufactured if greater production would not be subsidized 















Figure 4. Analysis of a Positive Externality 
Source: Modified from Goodwin et al. (2014). Microeconomics in context (Third Edition.). Armonk, New 
York : M.E.Sharpe,. , p. 264. 
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In sum, an excise tax results in the reduction of total social welfare as it 
imposes a deadweight loss to the society; apparently a gain that no one gets, to 
make the market outcome inefficient. However, externalities are prominent 
examples of market failure. Negatively or positively when they affect a market, 
government intervention seems to be necessary to achieve a socially efficient 
outcome. Particularly, when there is a negative externality in a market (e.g., a 
polluting product), the imposition of a tax certainly makes society better-off. Also, 
in the case of positive externalities (such as solar panels), subsidies could 
encourage greater production, thereby, resulting in the increase of overall social 
welfare. 
This section of the paper, in fact, provided rationale for the following 
quotation from the prominent PBS commentator Bill Moyers: 
"If you want to fight for the environment, don't hug a tree; hug an 
economist. Hug the economist who tells you that fossil fuels are not only 
the third most heavily subsidized economic sector after road transportation 
and agriculture but that they also promote vast inefficiencies. Hug the 
economist who tells you that the most efficient investment of a dollar is not 
in fossil fuels but in renewable energy sources that not only provide new 
jobs but cost less over time. Hug the economist who tells you that the 
price system matters; it’s potentially the most potent tool of all for creating 




The Tragedy of The Commons: 
A Generalized Prisoners’ Dilemma 
It is the time now to further examine greenhouse gas emissions reduction from 
the broader viewpoint of the tragedy of the commons. In economics, common-
pool (common property) resources are defined as the goods that are 
nonexcludable and rival; that is, they can be freely consumed by all people, but 
their use by one individual reduces their availability to others. Particularly, 
regarding the Earth atmosphere as a common property, literally anyone can 
enjoy it; however, since we live in a full world economy, each individual polluter in 
fact diminishes the availability of fresh air to others. 
Recall this quote from Hardin (1968): “Freedom in a commons brings ruin 
to all.” According to him, valuable common property resources would be 
overharvested. Overharvesting common-pool resources, as Klein and Bauman 
(2010) clarify, can be explained in the framework of the most famous 
simultaneous-move game in economics: the prisoners’ dilemma, a paradox in 
decision making with the following salient features: 1) Acting based on self-
interest, each player makes their decision disregarding the choices of other 
players; 2) The players’ dominant strategies make them all worse-off.  
Climate change, or the greatest negative externality in human history 
according to Heal (2017), is the consequence of global warming – which is in turn 
a prominent example of a generalized prisoners’ dilemma. Since World War II, 
economies have been growing exponentially, neglecting natural capital. 
Economy of scale has endowed humans with cheap electricity, gasoline, and 
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fertilizers; but also, rising sea levels. As a result of the unrelenting injection of 
carbon dioxide to the Earth atmosphere, the Earth’s inhabitants are facing now 
perhaps the worst tragedy of the commons ever; IPCC’s most recent scientific 
reports provide compelling evidence that the global economy, as emphasized by 
Victor (2010), is testing the limits of the biosphere. This case of prisoners’ 
dilemma in a large scale – with millions of players worldwide – help us realize 
how sometimes entire economies might collapse, and how abandoning nature 
might endanger our prosperity. 
Solving The Tragedy of The commons 
Recall that according to Coase theorem if nothing stops people from 
trading, buyers with high marginal benefits and sellers with low marginal costs 
will continue trading until all potential gains from trade are exhausted. Klein and 
Bauman (2010) assert that this theorem can solve the prisoners’ dilemma if the 
players of the game can negotiate an agreement; that is, negotiated agreements 
can also solve the tragedy of the commons. In other words, players need to 
consider others as well in their decision making; finding a way to align their own 
individual incentives with the goals of the group as a whole. To clarify this, Klein 
and Bauman (2010) provide an interesting example: Suppose that injecting 
steroids has become a dominant strategy of athletes. So, everybody wants to 
have the most powerful muscles even if the drugs might make them all bald and 
impotent. This is another case of the prisoners’ dilemma, resulting in the tragedy 
of the commons. In this case, a negotiated agreement to solve the tragedy could 
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be the submission of steroid testing to ban the sportsmen who fail. Remember 
this quote from Hardin (1968): “Conscience is self-eliminating”. 
In contrast to futile reliance on the conscience of individuals to control their 
behavior, negotiated agreements work to legislate temperance; as Hardin says, 
coercive (or persuasive) measures make bad behavior increasingly more 
expensive for the wrongdoer, and this is more effective than prohibition. Ostrom 
(2008) provides another example of successful coercive measures. In response 
to the problem of overharvesting fisheries, she refers to negotiated agreements 
(between local fishers and state officials) and mutual coercive measures that give 
effective protection to juvenile lobsters and proven breeding stock as well as limit 
the number of lobster traps. She says, and I quote, “These rules enable lobster 
fishers to monitor each other’s harvesting with substantial effectiveness.” 
Using a tradable permit system to keep fisheries sustainable, and levying 
taxes on fossil fuels to prevent rising sea levels are other examples - provided by 
Klein and Bauman - that reveal how negotiated agreements might help solve the 
tragedy of the commons. Ostrom also underlines the importance and 
effectiveness of quotas determined based on active dialogue while she criticizes 
the Hardin’s conclusion of an inevitable tragedy [in case of common-pool 
resources] as “too sweeping”. 
Using quotas in managing the harvest of common-pool resources such as 
fisheries, or the Earth’s atmosphere (when it comes to global warming and 
climate change) is kind of a “coercion device” in the words of Hardin. From the 
viewpoint of economics, tradable pollution permits perform roughly the same as 
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carbon taxes. These market mechanisms are, in fact, different means to the 
same end: curbing carbon emissions and generating revenue for governments to 
put to good use. 
Concerning the application of market-based approaches to regulate 
pollution, although no international regime that includes all countries has been 
implemented yet, the international community has taken a variety of approaches 
at multiple levels (Ostrom, 2008). Carbon taxes and tradable permits – also 
known as cap-and-trade regimes – both are intended to shape the behavior of 
polluters by making polluting increasingly more expensive. As regards to global 
warming and climate change, this policy responds appropriately to the question 
of Hardin about the unavoidable tragedy of the commons: “How to legislate 
temperance?” Policy makers can use carbon pricing approaches to make laws 
that shape the behavior of economic units by providing incentives, rather than 
prohibition. 
The economic rationale behind carbon taxes and tradable pollution 
permits is internalizing negative externalities. In Endangered Economies, Heal 
(2017) refers to the sound logic of making polluters pay the full cost of their 
actions, as the main solution to climate problem. According to him, there is no 
fundamental conflict between environment and economy; in that, these are 
market failures and unpaid-for externalities that we are suffering from. To bring a 
reconciliation between economic progress and conserving nature, he strictly 
recommends internalizing external costs, respecting property rights, valuing 
natural capital, and choosing the right way of measuring our economic 
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performance (finding a replacement for GDP that more accurately reflects what 
matters to society). These four aspects are not separate from each other. All 
pivot around a central point: making polluters pay via full cost accounting. 
Towards Sustainability: Valuation of Critical Natural Capital 
 In the context of sustainability and wealth of nations, Heal divides up the 
natural capital of nations into two categories: first, part of natural capital that 
communities can compensate for its depletion by investing in other forms of 
capital; second, the other category which provides to us essential services that 
cannot be replaced. He clarifies that the former (mineral resources such as oil 
and gas reserves) just gives its owners the advantage of generating wealth in the 
market; and it can be replaced with physical, financial, or intellectual capital. In 
contrast, the latter (living natural capital including forests, coral reefs, and 
ecosystems as examples) is more than just wealth; the loss of which cannot be 
compensated for and might jeopardize the human future. Oxygen and food are 
two specific examples of essential services that the latter type of natural capital 
provides to humans. In Heal’s (2017) words: 
“Oxygen is produced by photosynthesis, carried out by plants and by 
photosynthetic algae in the oceans, and we can’t replace them. Food is 
also something whose production depends on the services of natural 
ecosystems: it depends on the productivity of soil, a complex ecosystem 
easily damaged by overuse; on the climate, determined in part by the 
complex worldwide carbon cycle; and on the actions of agricultural pests 
that attack food crops and their natural predators, such as birds and bats, 
that keep them under control.” 
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Nonetheless, functioning markets have paradoxically resulted in questionable 
outcomes regarding the valuation of natural capital (Farley, 2008; Vardon et al., 
2016; Heal, 2017). As they work at the moment, markets value mineral resources 
highly (particularly oil); but not forests, coral reefs, and ecosystems. 
The reason behind this paradox, as Heal explains, is that the essential 
services provided by living natural capital (e.g., oxygen) are mostly public goods 
which makes it problematic to capture their value in the market. Public goods are 
nonexcludable and nonrival (Goodwin et al., 2014); in that, while their benefits 
are freely available to anyone, their use by one person does not diminish its 
usefulness to others. Moreover, Heal asserts that natural capital is often a 
common property. Recall that common property resources are those goods and 
services in economics that are nonexcludable and rival; that is, they can be freely 
consumed by all people, but their use by one individual reduces their availability 
to others. In a full world economy that we are living now (Victor, 2010), the Earth 
atmosphere is a common property as well because each individual polluter in fact 
diminishes the availability of fresh air to others. As Heal emphasizes, particularly 
the Earth atmosphere, and common-pool resources in general, are hard to 
conserve. Recall this quote from Hardin (1968): “Freedom in a commons brings 
ruin to all.” 
Now the question is how living natural capital can be valued and 
protected? Farley (2008) highlights the role of prices in conserving critical - or 
living - natural capital (CNC) as follows. While he points out biodiversity loss and 
climate change as the major threats to CNC, first he underlines the fact that the 
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valuation of natural capital may be difficult as we do not know exactly what 
elements of natural capital are critical. Nevertheless, he delves into the 
fundamental concept of “marginality” in conventional economics to explain his 















Adopted from the seminal paper of Farley, this figure illustrates a hypothetical 
demand curve for natural capital that becomes critical beyond an uncertain limit. 
In region I where natural capital is intact and resilient, the demand is elastic 
making marginal values insensitive to small changes in stocks. Monetary 
valuation (the way conventional economics works), may help allocate resources 
between conservation and conversion in this region. In region II, as capital stocks 
Figure 5. Stocks of Critical Natural Capital or Ecosystem Services 
Source: Modified from Farley, J. (2008). The Role of Prices in Conserving Critical Natural Capital. 




are less resilient and approach a limit – towards a full economy which is testing 
the limits of the biosphere as being warned by Victor (2010) – price increases 
rapidly; the demand curve turns inelastic and marginal uses become increasingly 
important. Here Farley suggests that “conservation needs should determine the 
supply of the stock available for conversion and hence the price”. In region III, 
capital stocks have passed ecological limits; price becomes immeasurable and 
the system collapses. 
“As global natural capital stocks come dangerously close to critical 
thresholds, we must learn how to solve the macroallocation problem. 
Monetary valuation attempts to estimate the marginal values of 
environmental benefits, then internalize them into market decisions to 
determine how much conservation and restoration is appropriate. This 
approach may be appropriate when we are far from critical thresholds, but 
under current circumstances, we should frequently adopt an opposite 
approach: To slightly paraphrase Daly (2007), conservation needs should 
be price determining rather than price determined.” (Farley, 2008; page 
1406) 
To value CNC appropriately, as Farley clarifies, firstly we must keep or restore 
enough ecosystem structure to sustain vital services; then, “surplus” supply 
would be available for conversion to man-made products. The intersection of this 
supply with economic demands will determine prices for ecosystem structure. So, 
the proper order is: first meeting sustainability requirements, and then using 
valuation to improve efficiency. The way that conventional economics works (the 
paradigm of economic growth), nonetheless, is quite contrary to what is should 
be. Valuation, Farley emphasizes, can inform sustainability if conservation would 
be price-determining, not price-determined. 
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 Farley also asserts that, in a full world economy we live in today, 
estimating thresholds for CNC is much more important than assessing marginal 
values. Furthermore, as he emphasizes, facing future uncertainties science will 




Policy Instruments to Reduce GHG Emissions 
A Review of Market-based Approaches 
GHG emissions come from goods and services that humans produce and 
consume. The market of such goods and services, nonetheless, fails to account 
for the emissions; in that, they have impacts that are not priced as a production 
cost. This represents a market failure. Economists suggest that the simplest and 
least expensive way to correct the market failure, and reduce the amount of CO2 
being dumped into the atmosphere, is to put a price on carbon emissions in order 
to internalize external effects. Today, the idea of providing incentives to reduce 
GHG emissions and making polluters pay seems to be reasonable and, from the 
standpoint of the theory of economics, doable. Increasingly 
governments/jurisdictions are introducing carbon taxes or institutionalizing cap-
and-trade regimes that improve market efficiency. Evidence shows that carbon 
pricing reduces emissions, stimulates Innovation, and raises revenues that can 
be recycled back into the economy. 
The economic rationale behind market-based approaches to pollution 
regulation is internalizing negative externalities; in that, polluters pay the full cost 
of their actions. According to Goodwin et al. (2014), for example when producers 
of a polluting product must bear a pollution tax, or a Pigouvian charge on 
pollution, more expensive than the marginal cost of reducing it, they will be 
motivated to curb pollution and continue this reduction as long as the marginal 
cost of pollution reduction is lower than the tax. 
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Nevertheless, since different firms use different technologies, their 
responses to the tax will not be similar. In other words, for each firm in the given 
industry, the amount of pollution reduction depends on the shape of its MCR 
(marginal cost of reducing) curve. But, each producer’s response to the 
Pigouvian charge is cost effective; in that, it reduces its level of pollution to an 
amount that any other level of pollution would impose higher costs to the firm. 
Maintaining that all firms behave in such a cost-effective manner, the total cost of 
curbing pollution in the industry is minimized. Cost-effectiveness in pollution 
reduction is one of the main advantages of market-based approaches in contrast 
to pollution standards or technology-based approaches that mandate firms to 
take specific actions. 
As a result of carbon levies, not only do producers become more efficient 
by adopting higher efficient technologies, but consumers reduce their amount of 
fossil fuel consumption. Moreover, revenues gained from pollution taxes can be 
used to fund environmentally beneficial projects, reduce income or employment 
taxes and, in a nutshell, help society adapt to climate change. (Aldy, 2017) 
A cap-and-trade regime is nearly identical to a carbon tax. As Heal (2014) 
emphasizes, this approach also performs based on the polluters pay principle. It 
establishes liabilities, as well, for the consequences of external costs. Cap-and-
trade schemes pivot around the basis of institutionalizing the right to pollution; in 
that, governments set limits on CO2 emissions and issue permits or allowances. 
Then polluting firms are expected to submit, for instance, one permit per each ton 
of CO2 that they release to the atmosphere. The total number of allowances is 
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capped and over time it is reduced. The market price for emissions, then, is 
expected to rise as the total number of allowances is reduced. 
Each issued allowance is in fact like a Pigouvian charge on pollution. 
Again, in this case (like a carbon tax), producers with lower MCR curves (who 
can reduce their pollution more effectively) have competitive advantage. In the 
case of a carbon tax such firms save money by not paying the tax because they 
could diminish their pollution to an optimum level. With a cap-and-trade regime, 
such innovative companies can sell their extra permits to producers who need 
more allowances due to their higher MCR curve or their intention to expand their 
business, etc. In other words, just like the case of a carbon tax, in a cap-and-
trade regime as well, the cutback in emissions occurs in firms whose abatement 
costs are the lowest. The most innovative companies faced with carbon taxes 
reduce their pollution to refrain from paying the tax. Such firms under cap-and-
trade regimes cut their emissions in order to avoid buying permits or even get 
some gains by selling their extra ones.  
Since 1970s tradable pollution permits have been kind of an anathema to 
some environmentalists who, as Heal (2014) explains, questioned how we could 
combat pollution by authorizing the right to pollute? Also, in contrast to direct 
regulation approaches and carbon taxes, pollution permits are perceived as too 
complex by some politicians. Nonetheless, from the viewpoint of economics, the 
two approaches are roughly the same in terms of performance. In the case of 
tradable pollution permits, as Heal clarifies: “If we can adjust the supply of 
allowances so that their price reflects the external cost of the pollution, then we 
37 
 
have internalized the external cost, which should produce an efficient outcome.” 
This is exactly what a Pigouvian tax does. 
Tradable pollution permits, nonetheless, originate from the Coase 
theorem. Ronald Coase, according to Heal, attributed external costs to poorly 
defined property rights. Recall from the application of Coase theorem that 
negotiated agreements could solve the tragedy of the commons. When the 
tragedy of the commons has led to pollution, it seems that putting a cap on 
pollution, and then let market participants trade available pollution allowances 
can lead to a socially efficient outcome at the lowest overall cost. Tradable 
permits, therefore, can be considered as tradable rights; the rights that are well 
defined, respected, and then allowed to be traded. Carbon taxes and cap-and-
trade regimes reach the same point from two directions: the former from the 
Pigou’s proposal and the latter following Coase theorem.  
Carbon Taxes vs Cap-and-Trade Regimes 
Price-based carbon taxes and quantity-based cap-and-trade regimes, if 
being appropriately implemented, can solve the pollution problem and save the 
planet Earth. They have an appealing side effect as well (Klein and Baumen, 
2014): the revenues gained from Pigouvian taxes, or [auctioned] cap-and-trade 
schemes as clarified by Goeree et al., 2010), can be put to good use in society. 
Compared to direct regulation policies that dictate firms to take specific actions 
(Barker and Crawford-Brown, 2015), both approaches can result in a given level 
of pollution reduction at the lowest overall cost (Goodwin et al., 2014). 
Nevertheless, the two approaches differ from each other in some respects (Heal, 
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2017). They have different administrative costs, for instance. Also, they differ 
from each other from the viewpoint of degree of uncertainty. Below the two 
counterparts are compared and contrasted from different perspectives.  
 The first and foremost aspect of comparison that comes to mind regarding 
the two carbon pricing approaches is their different degrees of uncertainty. 
According to Heal, with carbon taxes firms are certain about the cost of 
emissions; thus, making decisions on long-term investment easier. But, the 
amount of pollution reduction is unknown to policymakers in this case. On the 
contrary, tradable pollution permits gives policymakers confidence regarding the 
amount of pollution; at least from the theoretical perspective, institutionalizing a 
cap for pollution reduction means that governments determine the amount of 
emissions reduction. Nonetheless, unlike carbon taxes, cap-and-trade regimes 
make investment planning difficult for firms due to the following reasons: first, the 
price of permits is not predictable; second, the price is volatile; third, the 
allocation of too many permits (in [grandfathered] cap-and-trade schemes) 
prevent the system from working appropriately. 
 The amount of pollution reduction is unknown in case of carbon taxes 
simply because policy makers are not aware of the MCR curves of firms; 
consequently, they must raise taxes during the time to meet their desired target 
pollution reduction. In fact, carbon taxes start working (i.e., helping reduce 
pollution) when taxes are raised to an optimum level; high enough to signal 
polluters the profitability of long-term abatement. From the administrative 
perspective this might be possible, but it is unpopular from the political point of 
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view; mainly because a huge number of consumers (as well as producers) bear 
the burden of raised taxes and, as Barker and Crawford-Brown (2015) claim, 
people respond more to prospective [short-term] losses than to [long-term] gains. 
On the other hand, although the amount of pollution reduction is defined 
by governments in cap-and-trade regimes, these systems do not usually work as 
expected: in that, pollution reduction does not occur unless the cap would be so 
tightened as to keep permit prices high enough to signal polluters to react 
properly. In other words, while in the case of carbon taxes the trigger to reduce 
pollution is raising the Pigouvian tax to a working level, in cap-and-trade regimes 
the trigger is an enough-tightened cap that makes auctioning start. 
 Even though carbon taxes are politically unpopular, they are much easier 
to understand than tradable pollution permits. From the viewpoint of economics, 
tradable permits work in almost the same way as carbon taxes do. They might 
seem, nonetheless, a bit confusing not only to ordinary people but also to some 
policymakers. Much worse, cap-and-trade regimes sometimes provide to 
polluting firms the possibility of lobbying for free allowances. This, of course, 
makes tradable permits more favorable to firms than carbon taxes; especially the 
firms who can enjoy their lobbying power. However, the lobbying power of 
polluters in action prevent the whole system from working appropriately. Powerful 
firms may have side information that others do not. Such misinformation results 
in another type of market failure (Álvarez and André (2015); the cap does not 
work consequently. With extra permits in market, mainly grandfathered to 
powerful firms, the price of permits plummets to unreasonable amounts. 
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It is fair enough to say that factors such as the absence of a tightened cap 
or the problem of extra permits work as barriers to trade in unsuccessful cap-
and-trade systems. Perhaps the most serious challenge of cap-and-trade 
regimes is how to allocate the pollution permits? According to Heal (2017), the 
allowances are usually supposed to be traded within a specific period; e.g., within 
two to four years. Also, the starting allocation and re-allocation(s) are both 
problematic. Furthermore, when it comes to allocation, a grandfathering 
approach does not generate any revenue for governments. Also, the auctioning 
approach in allocation, which is politically more viable, has high administrative 
costs and demand appropriate infrastructure; making it harder to implement 
compared to carbon taxes. 
While grandfathered cap-and-trade systems are prone to suffer from the 
lobbying power of historical polluters, in auctioned regimes both the starting 
allocation and re-allocation(s) of allowances are problematic (Lai, 2008). 
Although in theory a cap can be defined in such systems reflecting the total 
amount of permitted pollution, determining the total number of permits (the total 
amount of pollutions) in practice is a daunting problem due to the difficulty of 
estimating critical natural capital. 
Overall, it seems that carbon taxes are more transparent and easier to 
implement than tradable pollution permits. Comparing the positive and negative 
aspects of both carbon taxes and tradable pollution permits, the former (with a 
gradual increase in taxes) is more applicable than the latter (with a tightened cap 
in order to phase out the right to pollute in a controlled way). See table 1.  
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Table 1. Comparing Market-Based Approaches to Carbon Pricing 
Carbon Taxes Cap-and-Trade Regimes 
+ Higher degree of certainty for producers; 
thereby, making their decisions on long-
term investment easier. 
- Firms have uncertainty about future due 
to: unpredictable prices, price volatility, 
and the allocation of too many permits 
- The total amount of pollution reduction is 
unknown to policymakers. 
+ Institutionalizing a cap for pollution by 
governments or responsible authorities. 
- Politically unpopular + More attractive to firms and industries 
- Raising taxes periodically adds to their 
political unpopularity. 
- Tightening the cap to a working level that 
gives firms a strong signal is not easy. 
+ Raising taxes is administratively 
possible; much easier compared to 
tightening the cap. 
- Tightening the cap to a working level 
requires the valuation of Critical Natural 
Capital. 
+ More understandable to both public and 
politicians. 
- A bit confusing not only to ordinary 
people but also to some policymakers. 
- Starting pollution taxes? Periodical 
raises? Desired target pollution 
reduction? 
- Challenge of how to allocate the pollution 
permits? Starting allocation? 
Reallocation(s)? Grandfathered or 
auctioned? 
+ Less administrative costs, and 
Lower risk of corruption 
- Auctioning allowances demands 
appropriate infrastructure and high 
administrative costs. Also, the risk of 
corruption is higher. 
+ Less side information - Grandfathered systems prone to suffer 
from the lobbying power of historical 
polluters. 
Overall, carbon taxes seem to be more transparent and easier to implement than cap-and-trade 
regimes. 
Source: Prepared by author based on (Goodwin et al., 2014; Klein and Baumen, 2014; and Heal, 2017).  
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The two market-based approaches to emissions reduction are roughly the same 
in theory; but, as Goulder and Schein (2013) assert, in practice carbon taxes are 
less problematic. 
Unlike other types of tax (e.g., income tax or sales taxes) which, as Heal 
(2017) emphasizes are politically unpopular, carbon taxes can even be appealing 
to public if being implemented properly with gradual raises in taxes resulting in 
socially efficient outcomes. See table 2 in which Heal compares different 
externality policies including the two market-based approaches. 








Regulation Bad Good Bad 
Cap and Trade Good Good Medium 
Taxation  Good Good Good 
Liability Bad Medium Medium 
Activism Good Medium Good 
Source: Modified from Heal, G. M. (2017). Endangered Economies: how the neglect of nature threatens our 
prosperity. New York : Columbia University Press. , p. 62. 
 
Ostrom (2012) provides a great insight when she compares the logic of 
behind tradable quotas with what is going on in practice between local 
stakeholders and officials in managing fisheries as common-pool resources: 
“The sustainable remedies in practice differ from the traditional textbook 
solutions, so those managing resources in practice are actually using 




Carbon taxes and cap-and-trade systems also differ from each other in practice 
although they are roughly the same, according to the literature of economics. In 




Global Overview of Carbon Pricing Initiatives 
Carbon pricing is not new. In early 1990s, a group of European countries 
pioneered carbon taxes. The world's first Pigouvian taxes were launched in 
Finland and the Netherlands in 1990. In the former country, the pollution tax 
covered energy content of fuels (gasoline, diesel, light fuel and heavy fuel oil, jet 
fuel, aviation gasoline, coal and natural gas) in CO2 emissions. In the latter, while 
the tax was introduced initially into the country’s environmental tax system, it was 
turned later into an energy tax, which was equally divided into energy mixed tax 
and carbon tax. (Lin and Li, 2011) 
One year later in 1991, Norway and Denmark levied carbon taxes. 
Although Norway imposed the tax on petroleum, mineral fuel and natural gas in 
1991, it was extended in 1992 to cover partly coal and coke as well. In this 
country, due to the fall in the level of investments in the oil and petroleum sector, 
the government was made to reduce its carbon tax. Moreover, the tax was not 
imposed on marine transportation, aviation and electric sectors and was levied in 
half for the pulp and paper sectors. In Denmark a proposal was passed to 
impose a carbon tax in 1991 to be put into practice in 1992. This tax covered 
natural gas, petroleum and other mineral fuels, except biomass fuel; and 
included transportation, power consumption for commercial industry and 
household, light and heavy industries. Countries like Norway and Denmark have 
recycled some of the revenue back to industries. (Markandya and Lehoczki, 
1994; Scrimgeour et al., 2005) 
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Sweden also initiated carbon levies in 1991. Lin and Li assert that the first 
carbon tax in this country was 250 SEK per metric ton CO2 (equal to $44.37). 
Even though the tax covered all fuel oils, the rate of the existing energy tax was 
reduced simultaneously. As a result, as highlighted by Elkins and Baker (2001), 
some high energy-consuming industries such as mining industry, commercial 
greenhouse industry, pulp and paper production industry, manufacturing industry 
and electric power industry were exempted from the carbon tax. 
Scrimgeour et al. provide some background data on carbon and energy 
tax existence and usage in above-mentioned five countries to show that Sweden 
generates the most revenue from carbon taxes among these European 
countries. See table 3. 
Table 3. Carbon and Energy Taxes in Some European Countries 
Countries with carbon 
taxes (date of 
introduction) 
Revenues from CO2 
tax (106 $PPP) 
Revenues from 
energy tax (106 
$PPP) 
% CO2 tax revenues 
in energy tax 
revenues  
Denmark (1993) 457 2905 16 
Finland (1990) 436 2519 17 
Netherlands (1996) 828 6990 12 
Norway (1991) 323 2429 13 
Sweden (1991) 1344 5140 26 
Source: Modified from Scrimgeour, F., Oxley, L., Fatai, K., 2005. Reducing carbon emissions? The relative 
effectiveness of different types of environmental tax: the case of New Zealand. Environmental Modelling and 
Software 20 (11), 1439–1448. , P. 1442 




Many international, national, and regional carbon tax initiatives have been 
implemented since 1990s. The Canadian provinces of Quebec and British 
Columbia are a couple of recent examples of the implementation of carbon tax 
initiatives. The province of Quebec led North America by applying a small carbon 
tax in 2007 on petroleum, natural gas and coal. British Columbia (BC) followed 
Quebec a year later in 2008 with a carbon tax initiative which was set to increase 
by $5 per year through 2012. It now sits at about $40 per ton per year. By 
scheduling the annual increases as much as five years in advance, consumers 
were sent a progressive signal that encouraged less fossil fuel use. 
BC’s carbon tax covers about three-quarters of the province's total 
emissions (World Bank, 2018). These are generated mainly from fossil fuel 
combustion and include natural gas flaring. The remaining untaxed emissions 
largely result from industrial processes in the natural gas, smelting and cement 
industries that do not involve combustion of fossil fuels. 
According to the World Bank’s (2018) report, British Columbia’s tax rate 
increased from 30 CAD (Canadian dollar) to 35 CAD per ton of CO2 equivalent 
on April 1, 2018 and will continue to increase annually by CAD5/tCO2e until the 
rate is CAD50/tCO2e (US$39/tCO2e) in 2021. Carbon tax in this Canadian 
province is intended to be "revenue neutral" (Duff, 2008). By law, all revenues 
from the BC’s carbon tax are used to reduce personal and corporate income 
taxes in the province. 
Carbon tax initiative in BC is proven as a successful experience. Since the 
tax was introduced, fossil fuel consumption has declined more rapidly in BC than 
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any other Canadian province and over the same period BC’s gross domestic 
product grew faster than the Canadian average. 
Like carbon taxes, cap-and-trade regimes are not new. The European 
Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) is a good example of tradable 
pollution permits that targets heavy emitters and, as highlighted in the World 
Bank’s (2018) report, remains as one of the largest sources of carbon pricing 
revenues due to its size. The European ETS has been criticized though for 
granting too many permits in its starting allocation in 2005. Other jurisdictions 
have also been exploring tradable pollution permits. China, for example, has cap-
and-trade systems in operation both at the provincial and city scales. In North 
America, California and Quebec established a joint cap and trade system that 
started operating in 2013. 
Like direct carbon taxation, cap and trade systems reduce emissions, 
encourage innovation and raise government revenue which could be used to 
support energy efficient infrastructure, tax code adjustments and adaptation to 
climate change. It has become clear in recent years that putting a price on 
carbon is the most effective and easiest way to reduce emissions. 
Emerging Developments and New Trends 
Today more national and subnational jurisdictions as well as private sector 
entities are adopting carbon pricing. According to the World Bank’s (2018) report, 
to date 51 carbon pricing initiatives worldwide have been implemented or are 
scheduled for implementation; this consists of 25 emissions trading systems 
(ETSs), mostly located in subnational jurisdictions, and 26 carbon taxes primarily 
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implemented on a national level. This trend is insufficient, however. Although the 
World Bank’s (2018) report asserts that carbon pricing can serve multiple 
environmental and social objectives, there is still a long way to go to address the 
full external effects imposed on the planet by global warming and to reach the 
reality of a sustainable development path. 
While the need to properly price carbon remains a major challenge, 85 
percent of global emissions are currently not priced at all, and about three 
quarters of the emissions that are covered by a carbon price, are priced below 
US$10/tCO2e. (World Bank, and Ecofys., 2017; PMR, 2017) 
Figure 6 - adopted from World Bank’s (2018) report - summarizes 
regional, national and subnational carbon pricing (ETS and carbon tax) initiatives 
implemented, scheduled for implementation and under consideration. 
World Bank’s (2018) report also compares carbon prices, share of 
emissions covered, and carbon pricing revenues of implemented carbon pricing 
initiatives across the world. See figure 7. According to the WB’s report: 
“While some carbon prices are increasing, further rises are needed to 
stimulate emission reductions in line with the Paris Agreement. … 
Increased cooperation between governments, businesses, non-state 
actors, non-governmental organizations and other stakeholders can 
accelerate implementation and increase ambition.” (World Bank, and 






























Figure 6. Summary map of regional, national and subnational carbon pricing 
initiatives 
               implemented, scheduled for implementation and under consideration 
Source: Modified from World Bank, and Ecofys. 2018. State and Trends of Carbon Pricing 2018. 





























Figure 7. Carbon price, share of emissions covered and carbon pricing revenues of 
               implemented carbon pricing initiatives 
Source: Adopted from World Bank, and Ecofys. 2018. State and Trends of Carbon Pricing 2018. 
Washington, DC: World Bank. © World Bank. 
 
 
Note: The size of the circles is proportional to the amount of government revenues except for initiatives with government revenues below US$100 million in 2017. the circles of these 
initiatives have an equal size. For illustrative purposes only, the nominal prices on April 1, 2018 and the coverages in 2018 are shown. The carbon tax rate applied in Mexico and Norway 
varies with the fossil fuel type and use. The carbon tax rate applied in Denmark varies with the GHG type. The graph shows the average carbon tax rate weighted by the amount of 
emissions covered at the different tax rates in those jurisdictions. The middle point of each circle corresponds to the price and coverage of that initiative. 
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Pitfalls of Cap-and-Trade  
Cap-and-trade regimes seem to suffer from some pitfalls in practice although 
they are expected to perform just like Pigouvian taxes, according to the literature 
of economics. The problems of the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme 
(EU ETS), the biggest trading pollution permits system in the world, since the 
year 2000 supports this claim. 
Free permits in Grandfathering Allocation 
 The first concerted effort to develop a multinational market for carbon 
emissions (EU ETS) suffers firstly from free allowances (Heal, 2017). Henríquez 
(2013) clarifies that under the grandfathering allocation approach taken in phase 
I of the EU ETS implementation (2005-2008), permits have been allocated at no 
cost to polluting companies in proportion to their historical pollution levels. 
According to Heal, this approach has been, and will be, more favorable to most 
polluters; compared with auctioning which is better for public and government as 
it generates revenue. He emphasizes as well that grandfathering permits (free 
allowances) is criticized especially by environmentalists; they argue that it is just 
like rewarding companies for a history of pollution. Also, in such an oversupplied 
carbon market (as described by Henríquez) companies would not have economic 
incentives to innovate and reduce pollution. 
An unfair allocation of permits makes the carbon market biased by putting 
most of the burden of internalizing externalities on short and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs). It seems to me that, in this case, the “Invisible Hand” of 
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Adam Smith would work solely in favor of historical polluters while unresolved 
negative externalities end in market failure. Furthermore, grandfathering does not 
generate revenues that can be recycled back into the economy (Cramton and 
Kerr, 2002; Goodwin et al., 2014; Klein and Baumen, 2014; Barker and 
Crawford-Brown, 2015; and Heal, 2017). As Heal points out, therefore, it is not 
politically saleable to public, as opposed to the auctioning approach in so-called 
cap-and-dividend regimes. 
When it comes to choosing one of the two allocation approaches, 
nonetheless, both grandfathering and auctioning are the same in terms of 
abatement. So, the choice of how carbon should be priced in a given country 
could be a pragmatic decision, made on the basis of what is likely to work best 
there regarding its political and institutional setup (Goulder and Schein, 2013). 
No matter how allowances are allocated, as Heal and Goodwin et al. clarify, low-
cost polluters (those with lower MCR curves) who enjoy cost effectiveness sell 
their unused permits to high-cost producers who need pollution permits. 
According to Lygre and Wettestad (2018), Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 
(RGGI), California, is the only ETS in the world that allocates most of its 
allowances through auctioning. Table 4 compares and contrasts the design of EU 






Table 4. Design Overview of EU ETS and RGGI 
 EU ETS RGGI 
Type of system Cap and trade 
Phase I: 2005-7 
Phase II: 2008-12 
Phase III: 2013-20 
Phase IV: 2021-30 
Banking allowed from Phase II on 
Cap and trade 
Phase I: 2009-11 
Phase II: 2012-14 
Phase III: 2015-20 
Banking but not borrowing 
 
Ambition level Initially no common cap 
2013-20: 21% reduction by 2020 (2005) 
Caps through emission 
budgets for each phase 
Coverage Power producers and a number of 
energy-intensive industries – airlines from 
2012 
Upstream focus (“direct” emissions) 
CO2; also nitrous oxide and 
perfluorocarbons (phase III) 
Around 11,000 installations 
Electricity generators larger 




Initially mainly free allocation 
From 2013 on, ca 40% auctioning, to 
increase 
Almost 100% auctioning  
Revenue earmarking From 2013, recommendation to use 50% 
of revenues for climate purposes 
Revenues to support energy 
efficiency, renewable 
energy and direct bill 
assistance 
Source: Modified from Scrimgeour, F., Oxley, L., Fatai, K., 2005. Reducing carbon emissions? The relative 
effectiveness of Wettestad, J., & Gulbrandsen, L. H. (2018). The evolution of carbon markets: Design and 






A System Prone to Price Fluctuation 
Cap-and-trade regimes fix a cap on greenhouse gas emissions while 
allowing the price to vary (Fay et al., 2015). As a result, most cap-and-trade 
schemes have shown considerable price volatility. The price of permits, 
therefore, is very sensitive to demand shocks. Perhaps this is the second 
shortcoming of such systems. For instance, Henríquez’s (2013) clarifies how the 
financial crisis of 2008 (occurred at the start of phase II of the EU ETS 
implementation) has caused plummeting permits price to low records in 2012. 
According to him, by the end of the compliance period in 2012, emissions 
dropped significantly (11.6 per cent compared with 2008) due to the slowdown in 
growth. Fay et al. provide another example from California as follows: “when the 
2000 energy supply crisis encouraged power companies to bring back online 
some older and dirtier plants, the resulting increase in the demand for nitrous 
oxide emission allowances drove prices from $400 to $70,000 per ton in the peak 
month”. 
The low price of permits provides no incentive to curb pollution. As a 
matter of fact, low-cost abaters who utilize more modern technologies reduce 
pollution despite having permits, only if they can gain from a meaningful 
difference between the cost of pollution reduction and the selling price of 
allowances (Goodwin et al., 2014; Heal, 2017). 
In my view, price fluctuations not only influence the market for permits but 
also are problematic concerning the important matter of conservation. If 
conservation of critical natural capital is fundamental to our prosperity, it is not 
55 
 
acceptable to see a drop in permits price in times of economic turmoil. In other 
words, conservation of natural resources must be continuous and ongoing 
through ups and downs (business cycles) of the global economy. 
One way to reduce price volatility, as suggested by Fay et al. (2015), is to 
allow for the intertemporal banking and borrowing of permits, by which 
companies can save extra allowances allocated to them for use in the future, or 
borrow from their future permits. Fay et al. points out that this approach has been 
partially implemented in the EU ETS, where banking is allowed without limit, and 
borrowing is limited to one year (to avoid depending too much on tomorrow’s 
institutions to limit today’s emissions). According to Knopf et al. (2014), other 
recent proposals to reduce price volatility include relying on carbon stability 
reserves or on price ceilings, price floors, or price corridors, beyond which the 
government buys or sells unlimited permits to stabilize the price. 
The Problem of a Wide Cap 
The third pitfall of cap-and-trade regimes is the problem of a wide cap. 
Although the amount of pollution reduction is determined by authorities in cap-
and-trade schemes, pollution reduction does not occur unless the cap would be 
so tightened that keep permit prices high enough to signal polluters to act 
accordingly. In other words, while in the case of carbon taxes the trigger to 
reduce pollution is raising the Pigouvian tax to a working level, in cap-and-trade 
regimes the trigger should be an enough-tightened cap that makes auctioning 
start. Nonetheless, as Heal (2017) emphasizes, a sudden phasing out of the right 
the pollute is too costly; perhaps because cap-and-trade schemes are more 
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complex to establish and more costly to administer than carbon taxes. Fay et al. 
clarify: 
“All countries already have a tax administration in place — and a carbon 
tax is mostly an extension of well-understood energy or fuel taxes — while 
a new institution must be created for cap and trade. Further, a carbon tax 
would presumably be the responsibility of the ministry of finance, making it 
easier for the revenues to be recycled in reduced conventional taxes. With 
cap and trade, the regulator must not only monitor emissions but also 
establish a registry for allowances and keep track of allowance trades and 
the associated changes in ownership of allowances.” (Fay et al., 2015; p. 
84) 
Due to the complexities and high administration costs of cap-and-trade systems, 
in all cap-and-trade schemes implemented to date, as highlighted by Heal, the 
cap has been progressively tightened over time; in that, the right to pollute has 
been phased out gradually - in a controlled way. According to him, permits are 
usually reallocated in periods of two to four years in cap-and-trade systems; 
compared to carbon taxes which can be increased annually. While an 
appropriate cap can guarantee conservation of critical natural capital (CNC), in 
action the cap in such systems is set far above its optimum level. Another reason 
behind an inappropriate cap is that the valuation of CNC is fundamentally a 
daunting problem.  
Improper Method of Auctioning 
Back to the first shortcoming of cap-and-trade regimes (grandfathering 
and excess permits), it would be promising to migrate from this approach of 
allocation to auctioning. According to Heal, concerning the EU ETS, the plan is to 
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transfer from grandfathering to auctioning in subsequent rounds of permits 
allocation. Nevertheless, there is no guarantee that auctioning works as 
expected. Recall from Ostrom (2012) who says: “the sustainable remedies in 
practice differ from the traditional textbook solutions”. In addition, improper 
methods of auctioning for the rights to pollute might cause another problem with 
cap-and-trade regimes. This, in its turn, can be the fourth weakness point of such 
systems. 
Would ascending auctions for the rights to pollute be wise selections? An 
ascending auction in pollution permits allocation means selling the right to pollute 
to highest bidders. I wonder if this method of auctioning works best towards 
solving the pollution problem and saving the planet Earth. Recall that 
conservation needs should be price determining rather than price determined 
(Farley, 2008). It seems to me that in an ascending auction, market forces (which 
work very effectively in conversion of natural resources into different forms of 
man-made products) are misguidedly supposed to determine the level of 
conservation. 
But, as emphasized previously in Economics of Emission Reduction 
section (Towards Sustainability: Valuation of Critical Natural Capital), to 
appropriately value critical natural capital (CNC), first we must keep or restore 
enough ecosystem structure to sustain vital services; and then, “surplus” supply 
would be available for conversion to man-made capital. In fact, the intersection of 
this supply with economic demands will determine prices for ecosystem 
structure. In other words, the proper order is: first meeting sustainability 
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requirements, and then using valuation to improve efficiency (Farley, 2008; 
Vardon et al., 2016; Heal, 2017). 
According to Farley, in the full world economy we live in today, estimating 
thresholds for CNC is much more important than assessing marginal values. 
Nevertheless, ascending auctions seems to work more consistently with the 
performance of conventional economics than the conservation of CNC; 
consequently paying the least possible for the most valuable natural resources. 
Obviously, this paradigm of economic growth is quite contrary to what it should 
be. We know that valuation can inform sustainability if conservation would be 
price-determining, not price-determined. 
There are different types of auctions in economics. Klein and Bauman 
(2010) classify them all into four categories, as follows: ascending auctions, 
descending auctions, 1st-price sealed-bid auctions, and 2nd-price sealed-bid 
auctions. Theoretically all types of auctions are expected to disclose how much 
something is worth, to encourage selling stuff fast, to ensure transparency 
(prevent corruption), and to generate the same revenue in many circumstances. 
As Klein and Bauman clarify, the dominant strategy of bidders in 
ascending auctions and 2nd-price sealed-bid auctions are the same; in such 
auctions, although bidders reveal their true values in the market, the winning 
bidder only pays the second highest bid. In contrast, in descending auctions and 
first-price sealed-bid auctions, bidders follow the strategy of shading their own 
bids; yet, the winner pays his/her own suggested price by the end. 
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While according to the literature of economics different methods of 
auctioning would end in the same results (generating the same revenue), it 
seems that the performance mechanism of descending auctions suits better to 
auctioning the rights to pollute. While a descending auction with the most 
expensive starting price possible looks like more reasonable for auctioning 
pollution permits, a conjecture for the starting price in such an auction could be 
the highest implemented carbon tax ever worldwide. The question is why not? 
A descending auction starts from a high price which is set by a regulator 
— governments or authorities in cap-and-trade regimes (Klein and Bauman, 
2010). Considering the importance of conserving CNC, therefore, even a lower 
limit could be applied in such an auction, especially in cases of economic turmoil, 
in order to prevent a sudden drop in prices. It seems to me that this way of 
auctioning is more consistent with our conservation needs. Also, we know that a 
tightened cap is required for an effective cap-and-trade regime. We know as well 
that the tightened cap demands the valuation of critical natural capital which is a 
daunting task itself. Starting with a high enough permit price (equivalent to the 
highest implemented carbon tax worldwide) combined with objective trial and 
errors, tuning policies, might guide us towards an optimum solution. 
Fraud and Corruption 
Another pitfall of cap-and-trade schemes is the problem of carbon offsets 
which can undermine the efficiency and fairness of such systems. Klein and 
Bauman (2014) explain how a polluting firm in a rich country, for example, can 
buy offsets to reduce emissions in another country (a poor one like Indonesia 
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and Brazil) rather than buying pollution permits for his/her own factory. While the 
former is settling GHG liabilities (paying to pollute), the latter, as clarified by 
Martin and Walters (2013), is to create carbon assets. Theoretically, the idea of 
buying offsets instead of buying allowances makes sense; firms can cut 
emissions through offsite projects that reduce emissions. If curbing emissions in 
poor countries is cheaper, the amount of pollution reduction per dollar in those 
countries would be even more, compared to that in the home (rich) country. 
However, as Klein and Bauman clarify, the devils to carbon offsets are in details; 
for instance, there is no guarantee that a given factory in the poor country 
continues cutting emissions after the receipt of fund from the rich firm/country; 
the polluting firm in the poor country might even be replaced next year with a 
dirtier factory elsewhere. See Gillenwater (2012) as well. 
“It seems that, at least on this specific issue, the emission offset 
community, myself included, has taken on the characteristics of a used car 
salesman … spouting off a term that sounds good to everyone but that 
does not clearly mean anything. We might as well have required that 
offset projects be ‘beautiful’ or ‘synergistic’ or some other vacuous 
buzzword that can be employed to sell an idea. You may have thought 
you knew what a ‘real’ offset project was, but … the offset community has 
fallen under a form of group think. What is amazing, and worthy of its own 
sociological study, is how we managed to go for long in our development 
of standards, laws, methodologies, manuals, and articles using such an 
ambiguous term for our fundamental concepts of offset project quality.” 
(Gillenwater, 2012; p. 169) 
Much worse than the danger of real offsets are non-existent credits; 
scams known as false permits. Real offset permits are created when a polluting 
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firm allegedly cuts carbon emissions, and then it gets permits which can be sold 
to polluting firms that need extra permits to emit more pollution. Theoretically, but 
not necessarily in action, one activity offsets the other. But, a very dangerous 
problem occurs if real CO2 is not being removed by the company seeking offset 
permits for pollution reduction. Because offset permits are worth real money, 
there are incentives to create false offsets; in that, earning offset permits for 
doing nothing. 
According to Martin and Walters (2013), the media has widely alleged 
fraud and criticized misrepresentation in carbon markets; as if governments are 
deceiving people. Also, cases of actual criminal fraud in the compliance and 
voluntary carbon markets have come under the spotlight by the media. As 
Lohmann (2010) points out, the risk of carbon fraud in both the allowance 
markets (EU ETS) and the offset credit market has been widely reported. 
Quoting him: “what are conventionally classed as scams or frauds are an 
inevitable feature of carbon offset markets, not something that could be 
eliminated by regulation targeting the specific businesses or state agencies 
involved”. 
Some analysts like Goulder and Schein (2013), nonetheless, believe that 
cap-and-trade systems’ potential difficulties with offsets do not constitute a 
weakness of such schemes relative to carbon levies. They assert that offsets are 
not an inherent feature of cap-and-trade; in other words, one can include or 
exclude offsets from such systems. Moreover, just as with cap-and-trade, it is 
possible to include or exclude offsets as part of a carbon tax program. To clarify 
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this, they provide two examples: South Korea’s proposed cap-and-trade program 
which bans the use of international offsets, and New Zealand’s cap-and-trade 
program allowing unlimited use of offsets. 
Martin and Walters attribute the most continued critiques of carbon credit 
fraud risk to NGOs such as Transparency International (2011), Global Witness in 
their report “Forest Carbon Cash and Crime” (2011), and Greenpeace’s “Carbon 
Scam” (2009). According to them, reports like these not only question the 
genuineness of carbon credit schemes, but indicate that “the lobbying power 
exerted by the powerful participating companies and the relative weakness of the 
regulatory structure gives rise to form of carbon fraud or “scam” at the global 
level”. Table 5 represents the types of carbon crimes reported by the media, 
police agencies and NGOs. 
Table 5. Typologies of Carbon Crimes 
Typology Crime risk Markets affected 
Computer crime Internet phishing, cyber theft Allowances, EU ETS 
State crime Recycling of carbon instruments Allowances, EU ETS 
Taxation crime Missing-trade fraud (MTF) Allowances, EU ETS 
Scams Investment scams, fake carbon credits, 
Ponzi schemes 




Falsifying records, fake offset 
schemes, pressure on local people 
Carbon credits for voluntary 
and 
compliance market 
Structural fraud Fraud risk through poor incentive 
structure, inadequate validation and 
verification 
Carbon credits in for 
compliance 
markets 
Source: Modified from Martin, P., & Walters, R. (2013). Fraud Risk and the Visibility of Carbon [Text]. 




Carbon fraud can indicate wider systemic properties of carbon 
marketisation that are inherently fraudulent (Bachram, 2004) and corruptible 
(Lohmann, 2010); and this, as emphasized by Martin and Walters (2013), 
connects with concerns of NGOs. Critics like Bachram and Lohmann argue that 
the way such incentives are structured creates an essentially unregulatable 
market. Also see Lindquist and Goldberg (2010). 
Finally, Leonard (2009) in “the Story of Cap and Trade” points out that 
while free permits and offsetting make cap-and-trade schemes unfair and 
ineffective, it would be a perilous distraction if such systems create a false sense 
of progress towards cutting emissions, or weaken our ability to make strong laws. 
To learn more about “what is working, what isn’t and why, when it comes 
to the practice of implementing an ETS”, see Narassimhan et al. (2018). This 
article compares eight ETS regimes worldwide against five main criteria: 
environmental effectiveness, economic efficiency, market management, revenue 




Carbon Taxes or Cap-and-Trade Systems? 
From the perspective of economics theory, cap-and-trade regimes give 
policymakers confidence regarding the amount of emissions reduction by 
institutionalizing a cap for pollution. In contrast to carbon taxes, such systems 
seem to be politically both more saleable to public and more interesting to 
industries with lobbying power. Nonetheless, they make investment planning 
difficult for companies due to the unpredictability of the price of allowances, the 
volatility of permits price, and the widespread allocation of too many permits 
which prevents these systems from working appropriately. 
Furthermore, in the implementation of tradable pollution permits, an 
enough-tightened cap that can help auctioning start (can keep permit prices high 
enough to signal polluters to react properly) is a daunting task; thereby not being 
easily achievable. This, in its turn, stops these systems from working as 
expected. In addition, cap-and-trade schemes are more complex to establish and 
more costly to administer than carbon taxes. Particularly, fraud risk and side 
information of powerful firms is problematic in cap-trade-systems. 
While grandfathered cap-and-trade regimes are prone to suffer from the 
lobbying power of historical polluters, in auctioned systems both the starting 
allocation and re-allocation(s) of permits cause problems. Although in theory a 
cap can be defined in such systems reflecting the total amount of permitted 
pollution, determining the total number of permits (the total amount of pollutions) 
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in practice is a daunting problem due to the difficulty of estimating critical natural 
capital. 
Overall, it seems that carbon taxes are more transparent and easier to 
implement than cap-and-trade systems. Comparing the advantages and 
disadvantages of Pigouvian taxes and tradable pollution permits, the former 
approach (with a gradual increase in taxes) seems to be more applicable than 
the latter (even with a so-called tightened cap in order to phase out the right to 
pollute in a controlled way). Although the two market-based approaches to 
emissions reduction are roughly the same in theory, in practice carbon taxes are 
less problematic; in terms of both political longevity and environmental 
robustness. Overall, carbon taxes are more transparent, much easier to 
understand, and more effective than tradable pollution permits. 
Cap-and-trade systems can be of “pure” or “hybrid” options. In the hybrid 
option of such systems there is a price ceiling and/or price floor. Like the case of 
carbon taxes, emissions price in the hybrid option of cap-and-trade schemes is 
exogenous. As Goulder and Schein (2013) emphasize, exogenous emissions 
pricing (whether through a Pigouvian tax or the hybrid option) has several 
attractions over pure cap and trade. As they clarify, “beyond helping prevent 
price volatility and reducing expected policy errors in the face of uncertainties, 
exogenous pricing helps avoid problematic interactions with other climate policies 
and helps avoid large wealth transfers to oil exporting countries.” Helping avoid 
an important form of carbon leakage can be added to this list. 
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Simultaneous Carbon Pricing Systems: Exploration and 
Advantages 
According to the World Bank’s (2018) report, to date 51 carbon pricing 
initiatives worldwide have been implemented or are scheduled for 
implementation; this consists of 25 emissions trading systems (ETSs), mostly 
located in subnational jurisdictions, and 26 carbon taxes primarily implemented 
on a national level. The report also categorizes the countries (e.g., Sweden, UK, 
Poland, France, and Portugal) in which ETSs and carbon levies have both been 
implemented or scheduled for implementation. Canadian provinces of British 
Columbia and Alberta are also included in this category. Return to figure 6 of this 
paper to find out more. Indeed, the simultaneous implementation of carbon taxes 
and cap-and-trade systems is possible. 
Initially separate cap-and-trade schemes can be linked, like previously 
distinct carbon tax systems that can be harmonized; in that, their rates can be set 
equal (Goulder and Schein, 2013; Aldy, 2017). 
“Linkage and harmonization can yield cost savings. Linking separate 
emissions pricing programs yields greater abatement effort in the region 
with the initially lower emissions price and less abatement effort in the 
region with the initially higher emissions price, thus spurring equal 
abatement at overall lower costs. Linking once-separate cap-and-trade 
programs allows for further (cross-jurisdictional) reallocations of 
abatement effort and thereby yields further cost reductions beyond those 
generated by separate programs." 
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Arriving at a uniform international carbon tax, nonetheless, might raise some 
practical difficulties; as explained by Goulder and Schein (2013), it demands 
knowledge of the incidence of a wide range of existing energy taxes. 
Other Climate Change Mitigation Policies Alongside Carbon 
Pricing 
Economists have long endorsed carbon taxes and cap-and-trade systems, 
as the most acceptable carbon pricing tools to combat global warming to date 
(Aldy, 2017). Indeed, curbing CO2 emissions from fossil fuels is our main task 
facing global warming. Nonetheless, as a prominent figure in the field (Stern, 
2015) emphasizes, carbon pricing should be complemented by other well-
designed policies. Otherwise, the Paris target of “well below 2°C”, at the pace 
and on the scale required without unacceptable costs and distributional impacts, 
may not be achievable. 
Such complementary policies to carbon pricing might include “the 
introduction of performance standards; new rules for city design, land and forest 
management, and investments in infrastructure; the development of new 
methods and technologies; and the use of financial instruments that foster private 
sector participation and reduce the risk-weighted capital costs of low-carbon 
technologies and projects” (Fay et al., 2015; and the World Bank’s Report of the 
High-Level Commission on Carbon Prices, 2017). These policies would work 
together with carbon prices and generally decrease the carbon price required to 
bring about the necessary emission reductions. 
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Regarding the implementation of other climate change mitigation policies 
alongside carbon pricing, it is important to highlight the potential advantage of 
carbon taxes over cap-and-trade systems. As explained by Goulder and Schein: 
“In the presence of a cap-and-trade program, introducing an additional 
GHG-reducing policy such as a performance standard might yield no 
further reductions in overall emissions. The reason is that overall 
emissions are determined by the overall cap or number of allowances in 
circulation. To the extent that the additional policy yields reductions in 
emissions by some facilities, the demand for emissions allowances falls. 
This causes the price of allowances to fall until all the allowances in 
circulation are again demanded. Overall emissions do not change. In 
contrast, introducing an additional GHG-reducing policy in the presence of 
a carbon tax can lead to a reduction in overall emissions. In this case the 
price of emissions – tax – does not change when the supplementary policy 
causes a reduction in emissions. For this reason the reduction caused by 
the supplemental policy does not lead to “emissions leakage,” that is, an 
offsetting increase in emissions elsewhere. Overall emissions fall. 
(Goulder and Schein, 2013; p. 19) 
See Fischer and Preonas (2010) as well as Shobe and Burtraw (2012) to find out 
more details about the advantages of carbon taxes over tradable pollution 
permits concerning the implementation of other climate change mitigation 






Conclusion and Policy Advice 
As summarized by the IPCC’s definitive reports, the scientific community has 
reached a consensus that climate change is real, is caused by human emissions 
of greenhouse gases, and has dire consequences. Particularly Canada with the 
longest coastline in the world, high altitude regions, and significant Arctic 
territory, has already been hugely impacted by global warming.  
 Also, the international community has agreed so far that responding to 
climate change is not within the capacity of just one country or a group of 
nations. There has been a growing consensus of opinion, as well, on the 
application of carbon taxes and cap-and-trade systems to help save the 
environment, as the foundation of humans’ prosperity. The idea is using tools of 
economics alongside power of capitalism to shape the behavior of polluters 
(individuals and firms) so that individual optimizations lead to outcomes that are 
good for the group as a whole. In this context, obviously the objective is 
conserving our critical natural capital, or simply saving the planet Earth for its 
inhabitants and next generations. And this goal can be achievable by gradually 
making carbon emissions more stringent or phasing out the right to pollute in a 
controlled way (Goulder and Schein, 2013; Aldy, 2017). 
 Since 1990s, each of the two market mechanisms of carbon pricing has 
been implemented in different countries and jurisdictions. The unsuccessful 
implementation of ETS in Europe to date versus the successful application of 
carbon taxes in Sweden brings to the forefront the conjecture of the superiority of 
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carbon taxes to cap-and-trade systems. This conjecture is strengthened in the 
Canadian context by comparing Ontario’s defunct cap-and-trade regime with the 
successful experience of imposing carbon levies to upstream businesses - oil 
refineries and power plants as clarified by (Murray and Rivers, 2015) -  in the 
province of British Columbia. One of the findings of this major research paper is 
supporting carbon levies as the superior approach of carbon pricing. For a 
number of reasons, discussed in the body of the paper, Pigouvian taxes work 
better than tradable pollution permits. 
 Canada seems to be on the right track, therefore, by imposing levies on 
carbon emissions. By winning federal elections, it is expected that the Liberal 
government will continue pursuing the Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act 
(GGPPA), enacted by Prime Minister Justin Trudeau in April 2019. Although the 
provinces led by Conservative governments (Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Ontario 
and New Brunswick) have refused federal Liberal demands to enact their own 
carbon levies, Ottawa has already imposed its tax in those provinces, started 
April 1 at $20 per tonne and will rise to $50 per tonne by 2022. Following the loss 
of the Premier of Ontario in its case against the Act enacted by Prime Minister 
Trudeau before the Court of Appeal in June, it is foreseeable that the Supreme 
Court of Canada (SCC) would also reject the appeal of Ontario’s Premier to the 
decision already made by the provincial Court of Appeal; confirming that the 
GGPPA is constitutional, and that it is especially with Parliament’s jurisdiction to 
legislate in relation to matters of “national concern” under the section 91 of the 
Constitution Act, 1867; Peace, Order, and Good Government (POGG). This is 
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expected, as well, to happen regarding the appeals of other conservative 
Premiers; like the Saskatchewan government has already appealed its 
unsuccessful challenge to the GGPPA and is expecting it to be heard in 
December. 
 A national carbon tax can and should be the centerpiece of Canada 
climate strategy. Indeed, the successful experience of British Columbia in levying 
pollution taxes can be a role model for other provinces too. Nonetheless, there 
might be valid concerns about the impact of such national policy on the 
international competitiveness of Canadian firms. Also, the argument that each 
province must decide on its own approach to carbon pricing should not be totally 
refuted. Therefore, it is fair to say: carbon pricing using the template of British 
Columbia works best in Canada, at least for start; a hybrid cap-and-trade system, 
or simultaneous implementation of carbon taxes and tradable pollution permits 
might be considered as well in some jurisdictions later. The crucial task, as 
Ostrom (2012) emphasizes in “The Future of the Commons”, is building trust and 
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Appendix A: Climate Change Timeline 
Climate change is an old idea although it has only become a matter of global 
discussion in the last few decades. According to Heal (2017), it was first pointed 
out in the works of Joseph Fourier, a French mathematician who was in his early 
twenties in 1789 when French Revolution began. Based on his calculations, 
Fourier expected the earth to be considerably colder than it actually was, given 
its mass and distance from the sun. He suggested that the atmosphere acts as 
an insulator that keeps the planet warm – the first clear statement of the 
atmospheric greenhouse effect which, as Heal highlights, today is central to our 
understanding of the human effects on the climate. Swedish chemist Svante 
Arrhenius (1859-1927) was another nineteenth century scientist who contributed 
(in more details) to the understanding of human effects on the climate. He noted 
in 1896, Heal indicates, that carbon dioxide acts as an insulator, and its 
concentration increase in the atmosphere leads to warming. 
Club of Rome’s provocative “Limits to Growth” 
The findings of Arrhenius and the enhanced greenhouse effect, Common 
and Stagl (2005) claim, did not attract much attention as a subject of scientific 
enquiry until 1960s. In was in 1972 that a controversial book titled “Limits to 
Growth” was published by the Club of Rome. It predicted dire consequences of 
unrelenting economic growth and faced Northern countries’ criticisms for not 
including technological solutions. At the same time, Southern countries were 
incensed because it advocated the abandonment of economic development. The 
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first World Climate Conference was held in Geneva in 1979 by WMO, the World 
Meteorological Organization. The conference, which focused on global warming 
and how it could affect human activity, issued a statement that called upon world 
governments to foresee and to prevent potential man-made changes in climate 
that might be averse to humanity’s welfare. Several conferences and workshops 
took place during the 1980s. Particularly, it was in 1985 that a meeting in Austria 
of the World Meteorological Society, UNEP and the International Council of 
Scientific Unions reported on the buildup of carbon dioxide and other 
“greenhouse gases” in the atmosphere. They predicted global warming. 
(International Institute for Sustainable Development [IISD], 2012) 
The birth of IPCC 
In 1987, one of the most important and influential reports of the last part of 
the twentieth century was published by the World Commission on Environment 
and Development (WCED). That report which is titled “Our Common Future” 
(also known as Brundtland Report) weaved together social, economic, cultural 
and environmental issues and global solutions. It was, in fact, this report that 
popularized the term “Sustainable Development” (ibid). One year later, in 1988, 
the WMO and UNEP created the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC), whose initial task was to prepare a comprehensive review and 
assessment with respect to the state of knowledge of the science of climate 
change; social and economic impact of climate change, possible response 
strategies (Henderson et al., 2017). To date, the IPCC has produced five sets of 
comprehensive reports; the last of which, known as AR5, includes three Working 
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Group (WG) reports and a Synthesis Report (IPCC, 2014). The first WG is titled 
“The Physical Science Basis”; the second, “Impacts, Adaptation, and 
Vulnerability”; and the third, “Mitigation of Climate Change”. The IPCC is 
currently in its Sixth Assessment cycle. See IPCC (n.d.) for the 6th synthesis 
report (AR6). 
United Nations Convention on Climate Change 
The UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), also 
called the Earth Summit, was held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in 1992. Particularly, 
in that conference, two conventions were opened for signature (IISD, 2012): the 
Convention on Biological Diversity and the Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC). The objective of the UNFCCC is to stabilize greenhouse gas 
concentrations and enable sustainable economic development (United Nations 
Information Portal on Multilateral Environmental Agreements [InforMEA], n.d.). It 
is guided by principles that reflect the recognition of global environmental 
responsibility. Parties of the Convention, as highlighted by InforMEA, are 
committed to establish national inventories of emission and sinks, formulate and 
implement policies to adapt to climate change, sustainably manage ecosystems 
and integrate the considerations in social, economic and environmental policies. 
In meeting these commitments, Parties can take account of their different starting 
points and are required to submit periodic reports to monitor progress. The 
Conference of the Parties (COP) is the supreme decision-making body of the 
Convention that regularly reviews the adequacy of the commitments (ibid). The 
COP meets every year unless the Parties decide otherwise. There are Subsidiary 
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Bodies to support the COP; including, but not limited to, the Subsidiary Body for 
Implementation (SBI). Decisions made by the COP are reviewed and analyzed 
by the SBI. In case of a disagreement between Parties concerning the 
interpretation or application of the Convention, they are to seek a settlement of 
the dispute through negotiation. 
The Kyoto Protocol 
The first COP meeting (COP-1) was held in Germany in March 1995 and 
provided a strong political mandate (the Berlin Mandate) which led to the 
adoption of the text of the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC at the COP-3 in Japan 
in December 1997 (IISD, 2012). This international treaty (the Kyoto Protocol) is 
intended to commit the state parties to reduce GHG emissions. The Kyoto 
Protocol, which is based on the principle of common but differentiated 
responsibilities, entered into force in early 2005 (InforMEA, n.d.). Differentiated 
responsibilities is the recognition of the fact that individual countries have 
different capabilities in combating climate change, owing to economic 
development (ibid); therefore, the obligation to reduce current emissions must be 
put on developed countries as they are historically responsible for the current 
levels of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. 
The Stern Review 
On October 2006, Nicholas Stern presented a 700-page report on the 
Economics of Climate Change to the government of the United Kingdom (IISD, 
2012). This report which is known as the Stern Review made the convincing 
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economic case that the costs of inaction on climate change would be up to 20 
times greater than measures required to address the issue at the time being. 
Public attention to climate change increased in 2007 when former U.S. Vice 
President Al Gore’s documentary, An Inconvenient Truth, was released and won 
an Academy Award. Simultaneously the IPCC’s alarming forecasts about the 
planet’s health made headlines. IPCC, as an independent scientific body and Al 
Gore won the Nobel Peace Prize together in that year (ibid). Also, it was in 2007 
that an international treaty (Montreal Protocol) was signed to protect the ozone 
layer by phasing out the production of numerous substances responsible for 
ozone depletion. 
The Paris Agreement 
The Kyoto Protocol's first commitment period started in 2008 and ended in 
2012. In the 18th COP in Qatar, states agreed upon the 2012 Doha Amendment 
to the Kyoto Protocol which establishes a second commitment period from 2013 
to 2020. Later, negotiations were held in the framework of the yearly UNFCCC 
Climate Change Conferences on measures to be taken after the second 
commitment period ends in 2020. This resulted in the 2015 (COP21) adoption of 
the Paris Agreement (IISD, 2012), which is a separate instrument under the 
UNFCCC rather than an amendment of the Kyoto Protocol. The purpose of the 
Paris Accord is to prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate 
system (InforMEA, n.d.). It aims to do so by strengthening the global response to 
climate change in general, including by: committing to a long-term temperature 
goal; enhancing adaptive capacity and climate resilience; and making finance 
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flows consistent with low-emission development pathways. The goals of the 
Agreement are to keep rising the global temperature well below 2°C above pre-
industrial temperatures while pursuing efforts to limit the rise to 1.5°C; increase 
the ability to adapt; and make finance flows consistent with a pathway towards 
low emissions and climate-resilient development (ibid). These goals, consistent 
with the Kyoto Protocol, are to be achieved in a manner that reflects equity and 
the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective 
capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances. 
The 48th session of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC, 2018) was convened from 1-6 October 2018 in Incheon, Republic of 
Korea, and announced on its Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C 
(SR15), as the target for 2030 to prevent climate catastrophe. The message of 
this new target is clear. Previous efforts (including the Paris Accord which 
targeted 2°C) have not been enough. In other words, countries should cooperate 
in action to meet the target. 
To emphasize the need for international cooperation, said the 2018 
committee for the Nobel Prize in Economics, the prize was given to William D. 
Nordhaus (for his contribution in and persuading governments to address climate 
change, preferably by levying a tax on carbon emissions) and Paul M. Romer for 
his critical role in fostering technological innovation. The award was announced 
just hours after the UN panel’s emphasis on the urgency of large changes in 




The most recent Conference of the Parties (COP24) was held on 
December 2018, in Poland. In this Conference, the UN Secretary-General 
warned the negotiators on that the climate change is running faster than we are. 
He concluded his speech with this statement: Failing to agree climate action 
would “not only be immoral”, but “suicidal” (United Nations, 2018a). The 
conference had two goals (United Nations, 2018b): goal setting for the 
decreasing in the amount of GHGs, and helping the most vulnerable countries 
already being most impacted by climate change. At best, it can be said that 
countries in COP24 revived Paris Agreement despite the objections of USA and 
other climate deniers. They agreed on how to calculate GHGs, but not to 
decrease it. Also, they agreed on 100 billion dollars of help to vulnerable 
countries which was much less that expectations. While climate activists believed 
that the outcome of COP24 was not enough to meet the targets and save the 
world, the UN Secretary-General emphasized on the importance of dialogue. 
 
